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1. Introduction 
This paper is about public values and the legal possibilities of a binding determination of 
(the scope of) these values in the course of Public Private Partnership (PPP).  
We consider this an important issue as, firstly, the standard legal opinion on binding 
determination of public values is, that this is a matter over which government holds a 
legal monopoly,2 and which should be driven by public values only, legally indifferent to 
private interests.3 Secondly, however, we find that especially in ‘wicked policy problems’, 
as concerning innovative and sustainable solutions, there is a need for a broader basis 
for rational (knowledge-based) and legitimate (interest-based) decision-making; a 
broader basis that requires participation by private (non-governmental) parties, both 
from the profit and not-for-profit sectors.  
Can and if so, how may these two elements be combined or, on a somewhat pessimistic 
tone, be reconciled? Can PPP, as a specific type of network-cooperation, offer a platform 
for such a combination? Is this a viable option to the extent that participation is geared 
towards making externally binding decisions (as legal acts) and that private party’s 
involvement exceeds the mere opportunity of offering advice and opinion – as we take 
the premise that a ‘broader basis’ for decision making must involve private party voice 
and (hence) private party commitment? In such an ambitious arrangement the public 
and private values involved and brought together in PPP will meet, but will they merely 
be confronted with and weighed against each other, or will they intertwine or even merge 
to an osmosis in which private values and public values reciprocally permeate each 
other’s definition and scope – and what consequences will or should this have for the 
relevant institutional settings?  
These settings are the rules relevant to making and performing public legal acts; acts 
that precede the stage of providing a public service or public works, which may, in itself 
be a matter of implementation by PPP. Most PPP-studies actually focus on the stage of 
implementing public legal acts and in these cases often PPP amounts to little more than 
applying the market mechanism (such as through a tender procedure). In this paper the 
PPP-option is researched in relation to actual decision making, weighing public values in 
network-cooperation that is underpinned by private interests, and with private parties 
having a say.  
The paper starts by showing relevance of PPP in the face of wicked policy problems, 
especially with regard to rationality and legitimacy, and continues by setting out how 
hierarchical government decision-making is to incorporate network-cooperation, firstly in 
general and, subsequently, in operational terms. These operational terms offer a ‘simple 
                                                
1 Maurits Sanders is lecturer in public administration at the Saxion Hogescholen Enschede and a Ph-D-student 
at the University of Twente; Michiel Heldeweg is professor of Public Governance Law at the aforementioned 
University. Both are involved in the Smart rules & regimes program of the LEGS-department at that same 
University. 
2 following, amongst other basic values, the ‘legality principle’. 
3 Both negatively, the promotion of private interests may not be the objective of determination (remember the 
French revolution; comp. the ‘Speciality principle’/prohibition of Détournement de pouvoir’!), nor positively, 
existing private relations should remain equal, unless this equality should as a matter of public interest be 
changed (as in changes in taxation or in welfare-support)(comp. the ‘principle of égalité devant les charges 
publiques’).   
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model’ for PPP and present the main dilemmas concerning the process of public and 
private value-exchange.  
 
 
2. Policy problems and criteria for ‘good’ policy 
 
Changes and developments influence the quality of life and the human environment. 
Citizens, bureaucrats and governors all assess such situations continually. These 
situations and changes can be expressed in objective measurable facts. For example, the 
length of traffic jams during the rush hour in a specific region, perhaps compared with 
the national average. Situations and changes, however, may also be described in 
perceptions and appreciations. This can be illustrated by the sense of loneliness felt by 
older people. Clearly situations and changes can be evaluated as desirable or 
undesirable. To arrive at such an assessment, a norm, standard or an ideal is needed, 
against which to measure or indeed to formulate an ambition. Ideals may be derived 
from opinions on how society should function. The confrontation between an existing 
undesirable state of social affairs and a notion of how these affairs ought to be or 
function, creates an social issue or problem (see: Van de Graaf & Hoppe 1996, p. 46). 
The traffic jams around big cities, the integration of immigrants and the pollution of the 
environment are examples of social problems. With such issues, it is possible to pressure 
the government to place them on the policy agenda and act. When an issue reaches the 
policy agenda, the social problem becomes a policy problem. 
 
Policy problems are unrealised needs, values or opportunities for improvement (Dunn 
2008, p. 72). The natures of such problems can differ. Van de Graaf & Hoppe (1996, p. 
48) typify a policy problem using a two-axis scheme: (i) societal agreement on problem 
formulation and (ii) certainty of scientific knowledge. The first reflects the degree to 
which there is a consensus about the desirable norm or standard by which a situation is 
assessed. There can be a strong consensus, or very little. The second axis reflects the 
fact that there may be clear facts or only contested views about a certain situation. This 
systematic approach leads to four types of policy problems: (i) technical problems, (ii) 
untamed technical problems, (iii) political problems and (iv) wicked problems. Table 1 
gives an overview of this classification.      
 
Table 1: Types of policy problems  
 
 
 
 
 
Societal 
agreement on 
problem 
formulation 
Certainty of scientific knowledge 
 
 Large Little 
Large Technical 
problems 
Untamed technical 
problems 
Little Political problems Wicked problems 
 
(See: Van de Graaf & Hoppe 1996, p. 48) 
 
 
Governmental organisations formulate policy for all such issues. According to Keynes 
(1971) and also Parsons (1995, p. 170), knowledge and ideas are the main sources of 
governmental legitimacy. Lindblom (1993) mentions similar starting points, but speaks 
about these as undependable values. In his view government has to be able to formulate 
policy that is intelligent and democratic. Similarly, Hoogerwerf & Herweijer (2003), as 
well as Van de Graaf & Hoppe (1996), point at rationality and legitimacy as two major 
standards for ‘good’ policy. Firstly, a policy has to foresee a solution for a societal 
problem. This means that it has to pass the criteria of rationality. A policy can be seen as 
more or less rational or reasonable depending on the reason or argumentation on which 
it was grounded, since this can provide proof against fundamental criticism (Hoogerwerf 
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& Herweijer 2003, pp. 90-91). Secondly, a policy is a politically sanctioned plan since a 
policy programme is subject to political scrutiny. If it survives political debate, it fulfils 
the legitimacy standard (See: Van de Graaf & Hoppe 1996, p. 46). On this basis, the plan 
acquires legal status, and there is a possibility that the policy programme will be 
accepted by society. 
 
 
3. The policy network approach as a solution for rationality and legitimacy 
issues in policy formulation 
 
Over some time, government was regarded the central actor in dealing with and solving 
societal problems. It has had the exclusive task of formulating rational and legitimate 
policy interventions and subsequently implementing them. This concept of monopolist 
task allocation leads to an image of ‘the government’ as ‘the central steering agency’ 
(Snellen 1987, p. 18) for societal changes and developments. To fulfil this task, 
government provides instructions to formulate policy programmes in the course of which 
binding governmental decisions are taken. The bundled activities by which a policy is 
shaped is generally referred to as the policy process. In policy studies, traditionally the 
policy process is described in different stages, modelled in a reproductive cycle (see 
Parsons 1995; Hoppe 1996; Hoogerwerf & Herweijer 2003; Van Hoesel et al. 2005). This 
is illustrated in Figure 1. According to this model, the policy process is a rational political-
administrative activity. In the process, interaction takes place through hierarchical 
relationships, bureaucratic institutional frameworks and defined checks and balances. The 
government is seen as the actor with a monopoly on defining the policy problem, 
formulating  policy alternatives, selecting a policy option, implementing it and finally 
evaluating it (see Sabatier 1999; Van Hoesel et al. 2005).  
 
Figure 1: The policy cycle  (based on Parsons, 1995 and Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2003) 
 
  
The tradition of viewing a proposed policy as a product that is the outcome of rational 
decision-making is not without criticism in policy studies. According to Sabatier (2007, p. 
7), the policy-stage model fails to allow adequate room to a multi-actor and multi-level 
Social Problem 
Identifying 
alternative 
responses and 
solutions  
Problem 
definition 
Selection of 
policy option 
Implementation 
Enforcement 
Evaluation 
Policy ending 
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approach in policy formulation. This point may be linked to the growing awareness that 
there is a lack of steering capacity in the government when it comes to policy-making 
and implementation (see: Heldeweg 2006; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997; Rhodes 
1997; Hufen & Ringeling 1990). 
 
As a consequence of its failure to develop sufficient steering capacity, government is no 
longer able to adequately deal with societal problems in their original institutional 
context. In implementing public policy, government has, in recent decades, increasingly 
relied on the input of experience and knowledge from private actors. This has led to a 
new balance in tasks, responsibilities and authority among public actors, citizens and 
business enterprises. This repositioning of actors has lead to new equilibriums in 
interdependencies between public and private actors.4 This has had a profound influence 
on the manner in which the government coordinates societal life. Thompson (1991, p. 1) 
makes a distinction between three coordination mechanisms in societal life: (i) market, 
(ii) hierarchy and (iii) network. In the policy field, there is a visible shift from the 
traditional hierarchical approach towards a network approach (see Van Heffen, Kickert & 
Thomassen, 2000). The policy network features autonomous interdependent actors 
trying to cope with policy problems through horizontal relationships. Crucial element in 
these horizontal relationships is actor cooperation on an interactive and reciprocal basis 
(see Heldeweg 2006, p. 217). 
 
The cooperation between the government and actors from the policy field has the 
objective of realising a surplus; an added value that is not (as easily, if at all) obtainable 
in traditional coordination between government and the market. For society, this surplus 
appears as increased rationality and legitimacy of the policy programme. Not all policy 
problems are in need of such a network approach. The typology of Van de Graaf & 
Hoppe, however, points at the policy problems which are particularly in need of either 
increased (certainty on) information and scientific knowledge, or of societal agreement 
on problem formulation. In the first case, rationality of the policy intervention is 
increased and, in the second, legitimacy of the policy programme is enhanced. One or 
the other, or both, is possible for either: (i) untamed technical problems, (ii) political 
problems and (iii) wicked problems. That is, the character of policy problems can be 
changed by increasing the rationality and/or legitimacy. This is illustrated in Table 2.  
 
                                                
4 In policy studies this is called the ‘governance’ issue. This concept has become increasingly fashionable and 
covers many trends and developments; thus becoming a ‘container concept’ (see also, Hajer, Tatenhove & 
Laurent 2004). Rhodes (1997, p. 47), distinguishes six types of governance including ‘corporate governance’ 
and ‘good governance’. In the context of this paper, governance is understood as a manner of steering or 
coordination that contrasts with the traditional hierarchical approach of central governments (Heldeweg 2006, 
p. 217). This corresponds to Rhodes’ conceptualisation, since he relates the concept to self-organising, inter-
organisational networks (1997, p. 53). Similarly, Van Heffen, Kickert and Thomassen (2000, pp. 3-5) 
distinguish two types of governance: multilevel governance and multi-actor governance; “Generally speaking, 
the ongoing vertical differentiation of public administration systems into supranational, national, regional, local 
and quasi-autonomous government organisations furthers the interaction of institutions.” Van Kersbergen 
(1999, p. 85) states that, “…. the interrelations between the [European] states, the supranational organisation, 
and the various levels of governance have by now acquired such a scale and have become so complex that a 
new and unique system of multi-level governance has emerged. (see also Marks, 1997; Thomassen & Schmitt, 
1999). Furthermore, public policy has become a matter of cooperation between governmental organisations and 
societal actors. Hence public management and policy-making are presently best characterised in terms of 
processes in which a large number of actors are involved, both from the public arena and from civil society 
(multi-actor governance) (Van Heffen, Kickert & Thomassen 2000, p 3-5).” This paper is about multi-actor 
governance.       
 
Sanders & Heldeweg, NIG-Public Values, Osmosis or an impossible match? October 2008 5 
 
Table 2: Changing problem types through the network approach (based on the typology 
of Van de Graaf & Hoppe, 1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
Societal 
agreement on 
problem 
formulation 
Certainty on scientific knowledge 
 
 much little 
much Technical problems 
 
Untamed technical 
problems 
 
 
 
little  Political problems Wicked problems 
 
 
 
4. PPP as an organisational form to resolve societal problems - the big picture 
 
A Public Private Partnership (PPP) is an example of a new organisational form for 
government to use to deal with societal problems. In this new form, policy formulation 
and decision-making take place in a multi-actor context. In public policy formulation, 
over recent years, a whole range of meanings has been labelled ‘PPP’. The common 
denominator of that range is the fact of a public actor cooperating with a private actor to 
realise a common purpose. At the same time, social science literature also presents a 
wide diversity in the definitions used to conceptualise PPP-cooperation in literature. In 
this paper we opt for the definition by Bregman, especially because he proposes a clear 
distinction between a PPP and more traditional forms of cooperation. The definition used 
by Bregman (2005, p. 5) is: 
 
A PPP is a legally structured type of cooperation between the government and private 
actors  concerning spatial planning and the exploitation, other than traditional modes of 
allocating task between government and private actors. 
 
The core of the approach by Bregman is that the forms of cooperation between 
government and private actors can be divided into two main groups, as two types of 
cooperation relationships. To understand how a PPP differs from what Bregman calls ‘a 
traditional allocation of tasks’, one must look at the important differences across the 
spectrum of three types of coordination mechanisms: the government hierarchy, the 
market and the network. In this paper, the position taken is, that a PPP is a form of 
network steering in which public and private actors jointly take decisions, on the basis of 
the following characteristics: 
 
a. there is a constitutive agreement on the input of various types of resources and the 
risk allocation; 
b. the extent of substantive resource inputs and subsequent benefits have deliberately 
not been defined; 
c. coordination and decision making take place in a network; 
d. the outcome of the network is legally binding for the involved actors and possibly for 
third parties. 
 
The characteristics above clearly place a PPP outside the government hierarchy and 
market steering coordination mechanisms. This is the case because steering is not left to 
the government alone and similarly not only to the market. It is not about an 
organisational form that aims to deal with public values through one-sided decision-
making, but equally it is also not about a form in which private actors are responsible for 
dealing with public values in a context of supply and demand. The core of a PPP is that 
public and private actors cooperate to deal with a public value, and in a way where the 
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responsibilities and control are not assigned to a single party. The characteristics listed 
above are explained below in more detail. 
 
Characteristic a – the constitutive agreement  
In a PPP there is a constitutive agreement between the parties that cooperate. This 
contractual arrangement is the basis for the cooperation. The document takes account of 
the way in which the policy issue is to be implemented. Furthermore, it provides a legal 
structure for the network-organisation. This means that it binds the parties in the policy 
network. Each of the contract partners has some of the available resources that are 
necessary for the realisation of the outcome. A combination of a strategy and resources 
is essential for an optimal policy outcome. To achieve this, the actors that are involved in 
the network need to agree on the type of resources that they will contribute.  
Klijn & Koppenjan (2004, pp. 144-145) distinguish five types of resources: (i) financial 
resources, (ii) production resources, (iii) competencies, (iv) knowledge and (v) 
legitimacy. Beyond (type of) resources each will provide, parties to the network need to 
also agree on the allocation of risks. There are inevitably risks and uncertainties when 
parties deal with policy problems. These risks are connected to events and 
circumstances, and the implications need to be allocated to the sphere of risks one (or 
more) of the involved parties have to bear (Bregman 2005, p. 174). Before cooperation 
starts, there must be an inventory of these risks, and there must be agreement on the 
mechanisms for risk control and their specific allocation. These points should be 
embedded in the constitutive PPP contract.  
 
Characteristic b – resource inputs 
In the formulation and implementation of a policy solution, the resource contributions 
from the policy network partners are complementary and hence cumulative. Thus the 
general expectation is that the cooperation will generate a surplus. In other words, PPP-
cooperation leads to a result that a more traditional role-play between the government 
and private parties cannot achieve. Given the nature of the policy problem preceding the 
establishment of a PPP, the societal surplus may be expressed in either an increased 
rationality or an increased legitimacy of the policy programme. 
An (almost) unconditional contribution of resources, by the parties involved, is seen as 
the best breeding ground for this surplus; better than in the traditional setting where 
parties carefully calculate their contributions and benefits. Attempts at formulating 
unconditional contributions and motivation in contractual legal terms, however, stand the 
chance of (unwillingly but inescapably) leading to ‘conditional’ barriers. The premise for 
unconditional participation effort is intrinsic motivation, supported by the view that an 
increased contribution leads to an enhanced outcome (more positive than in a traditional 
approach). Hence the intended substantive result of PPP can not be completely or 
conclusively described ex ante. This calls for an incomplete contract, addressing input of 
main types of resources, a sharing of (surplus) benefits, a general and provisional 
description of the object of cooperation, and basic ‘rules of the game’. Clearly, for this 
‘formula’ to provide success, trust between parties will be the driving force of the 
cooperation. In essence PPP distinguishes itself from traditional organisational forms, as 
‘soft law’ on substantive issues, as against ‘hard (contractual) law’ concerning specific 
contributions and results. 
 
Characteristic c - coordination 
The previous analyses shows that there is an interdependent relationship between actors 
in the realisation of a policy programme through a PPP. Drawing on their own 
organisational backgrounds, they arrange a contractual relationship. This agreement 
defines the type of resources that the actors will contribute and the allocation of risks, 
but it is incomplete in terms of the extent of resource contribution and the substantive 
specifics of the (end) result. Given the incomplete contract, trust is the fundamental 
basis and driving force of the cooperation. Since the more traditional coordination 
mechanisms (of governmental hierarchy and market steering) are based on distrust, 
there is a need in a PPP to develop a coordination mechanism based on trust. This is the 
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case in the network approach since policy networks are reasonably stable patterns of 
social relationships between interdependent actors that take shape around policy 
problems and/or policy programmes (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997, p. 6). These 
authors distinguish three important characteristics of networks (ibid., p. 31): 
a. networks exist because of interdependencies between actors; 
b. networks consist of a variety of actors each with their own goals; 
c. networks consist of relationships of a more-or-less lasting nature between actors.      
 
Characteristic d - outcomes 
Participation in a policy network is aimed at delivering an optimal policy solution to deal 
with a societal problem. The parties that cooperate do so for the sake and on behalf of 
society. It is possible that the policy programme and its outcomes have an effect on the 
quality of life and the environment of citizens. For this reason, a policy programme has 
associated legal claims and duties. This is authorised by the fact that on the basis of 
network cooperation, a governmental authority must take a legally binding policy 
decision that states these claims and duties.  
 
 
5. Policy formulation in a PPP: the creation of value hybridity 
 
In dealing with a particular societal problem, the tradition image is that of government 
initiating policy formulation and eventually taking a legal decision on the outcomes. 
Policy formulation in a PPP, however, deviates from this hierarchical path. That is 
because, for the optimum result, government is dependent on the inputs of resources by 
other parties. The identification of alternative responses/solutions and the selection of 
options does not take place in a bureaucratic organisation, but in the context of 
organisations linked in a policy network. This network can be seen as a puzzle. Like all 
proper puzzles, all the necessary pieces have to be put in their right place before you can 
see the picture: in a network, complementary resource contributions by parties and a 
common strategy are necessary for an optimal policy outcome. The organisations 
together shape a decision arena. In this arena, all parties are equal and together they try 
to manage a societal problem. In this context, they retain their own identity and each act 
on the basis of their own organisational objectives. Given the dependency of their 
relationship, the focus needs to be on the interaction processes between the parties. This 
interaction results in an agreed combination of goals, resources and time choices, and 
eventually in a specific policy programme outcome. In the policy network approach, the 
network process produces the output’s content. Then this outcome is fed back into the 
hierarchical decision-making process. Figure 2 gives an overview of this process.  
 
Figure 2: Policymaking in policy networks by PPP 
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Figure 2 shows that, in the policy process for a PPP, two coordination mechanisms are 
combined: (i) the governmental hierarchy in which the policy task is formulated and the 
decision about the policy programme is taken, and (ii) the policy network that delivers 
the content of the policy programme. A consequence of the converging coordination 
mechanisms is value hybridity in the policy process. The policy programme becomes the 
result of interaction between public and private actors. Each of the parties contributes 
from its own value orientation. The only relevant value for government is the public 
interest, since this frames their concern with the societal problem at hand. The private 
actors participate primarily on the basis of their private interests, which gear their input 
in the PPP-cooperation.  
 
 
6. The organisation of value hybridity- part 1 (preliminary remarks) 
 
This is all nicely said – at least, we hope so – but can it be done in practise, also in terms 
of legal acceptance? Is it possible to indeed ‘hybridise values’ in the sense that private 
and public values, as pursued by either public or private participants, are moulded into a 
synergetic framework or operative mode, which then serves both?5 We will look into this 
question in the below by outlining a ‘simple option’, in which this synergy is considered in 
terms of combining valuable resources or competences. Secondly, we will reflect on the 
outcomes of that option in terms of effectiveness and legal acceptability and, if 
necessary, make suggestions on alternative options.  
 
Before we outline this option, it should be understood that the measure to which both 
types of values or interests are served synergetically may be conceptualised differently. 
One way may be to require an ‘equal share’ in the benefits described in the above as the 
surplus. Yet another may be a ‘strong Pareto-optimal’ approach, in which none of the 
values looses out and at least one stands to gain,6 or an amendment which entails that 
both (or all) values should gain from the surplus (as a ‘weak Pareto-optimum’), albeit not 
necessarily to the same extent. While preferring to proceed on the basis of the latter 
                                                
5 Again, also in ways that are legally acceptable. 
6 Without pushing this economic metaphor to the level of the Kaldor-Hicks proposition in which a Pareto-
optimum may also be reached through compensation of the costs or loses to the one by part of the fruits to the 
other. 
Identification of 
alternative responses/ 
solutions and 
evaluation of options 
Selection of policy 
option 
Policy network 
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(‘weak’, surplus-for-all) concept, we feel that it is not fruitful here to elaborate on if and 
how a measure for comparison may be formulated.  
It should, however, be clear that the concept of synergy serving both interests, suggests 
that there is sufficient constructive-overlap between the relevant values or a sufficient 
ability to accommodate such an overlap, both in terms of the values themselves and in 
terms of the abilities of the participants to a PPP to express these overlapping values and 
abide by them. As shown by (amongst others) Van der Wal (2008), on an empirical basis 
professional decision-makers in private and public organisations/arenas show a 
considerable overlap in their value orientations – suggesting an ability to express and 
abide by values ‘from both sides of the isle’. As this also suggests a common core of 
values, such as efficiency, effectiveness and loyalty to the organisational objectives, the 
prospects at a synergy seem positive. However, without wanting to tantalise, the stance 
taken in this paper is that the public values paramount, or even exclusive to the initiative 
taken by the competent public authority, may in the course of the procedures not be 
corrupted by private interests.7  
As to the outcome of procedures, the decision taken must comply with public law 
requirements concerning unilaterally binding legal acts. This will entail, amongst other 
requirements, that the outcome must and may only serve the general interest, setting 
aside that private interest may benefit, but no other than as an indifferent result of that 
decision – that is: indifferent in terms of their weight in the decision-making process. In 
other words, a synergy in values may underpin commitment and shape the PPP-arena, 
but both in initiative and outcome values must be considered separately and public 
values must be the exclusive drivers and determinants. 
 
These remarks follow (also) from the focus on PPP as an arrangement for decision-
making, that is a decision as a legal act with public authority, and not on implementation 
of a decision in terms of providing a service8 or constructing public works! This is why the 
aspect of hybridity or synergy is so important, as the PPP directly concerns joint decision 
making, not ‘merely’ implementation. Although in the course of implementation iteration 
between public and private parties is possible, and the public party may adjust a 
(provisional) decision that is already taken, in the face of difficulties or opportunities 
arisen as implementation proceeds, generally this interaction still rests on a traditional 
role-model.9  
To clarify our focus we may compartmentalise, and must separate different stages of 
policy-making. This will show that policy-making within a PPP-network is a separated 
segment of the chain of policy-making which overarching principle is governmental 
hierarchy (see in the above). For our purposes we distinguish the following segments or 
steps within the policy chain: 
1. Starting point of prioritising and setting the agenda for decision-making (policy 
priority); 
2. Procedural decision by competent authority (to shift decision-making to a PPP-
network); 
3. PPP-network decision-making; 
4. Declaratory decision, by the competent authority legally ascertaining the go-ahead; 
5. Implementation of the decision taken under 4, possibly involving PPP; 
6. Final results, hopefully solving the policy problem identified under nr. 1. 
 
So, again, this paper focuses on PPP as relevant to segment or step nr. 3. However, the 
possibility of a second PPP-stage (see nr. 5) may have effects on earlier decisions (see 
below). Furthermore, it may show that the kind of wicked policy problems as discussed 
                                                
7 In short: this is what the French revolution was all about! Separating ‘imperium’ from ‘dominium’. See als the 
prohibition of ‘Détournement de pouvoir’ (abuse or, rather, misuse of power, for personal gain or irrelevant 
public interests).   
8 Other than to make legal acts (legislative or administrative; either or not as a matter of supervison, 
enforcement or dispute settlement).  
9 Only in as much as private parties may explicitly influence adjustment of a given decision, in terms of having 
a (more than merely advisory) say in that decision, does this resemble the situation on which we focus in the 
paper. 
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here require iteration between step 3 and step 5, the essential element being that step 3 
involves a weighing of interests, involving general interests or public values, whereas in 
step 5 issues are of an operational and technical nature. In this latter stage problems are 
solved by discretely choosing the best operational or technical option, considering 
available resources. Complications in step 5, the best operational/technical option 
involving a rearrangement of interests weighed or involved may require a re-evaluation 
or further precision in those general interest decisions in step 3, as mentioned before.  
 
 
7. The organisation of value hybridity- part 2 (step by step) 
 
First, we will address the different steps as a linear process, applying the ‘simple 
approach’ of merely seeking to combine the necessary resources or competences. We do 
so, as we think this will clarify the opportunities and threats to value hybridization (which 
will, in part, be discussed alongside and, in part, in the next paragraph).  
 
7.1. Policy priority: setting the agenda 
Our starting point lies with a perceived public challenge or problem in which a public 
interest crystallizes as a policy priority. This is the stage of agenda setting.10 Sometimes 
this is a simple matter of a request to take a legally prescribed decision (on the basis of 
one specific power to perform a single administrative act). On the other hand this priority 
may follow from public concern, articulated in a general plan, budget or legislative 
assignment, or, more incidentally, voiced by the press, by private parties in or outside 
the market, or from a parliamentary or (public) advisory body, or as a clear and present 
‘danger’, as a state of affairs, such as physical disaster or economic decline. Thus this 
concern manifests itself as an appeal on a government believed to be most competent, to 
act – in which ‘to act’ means to take decisions which provide the necessary legal basis (in 
terms of rights and/or duties) for establishing or legally underpinning existing physical 
measures. The before body or office will henceforth be called the competent authority (or 
authorities, as it may turn out that a joint decision or a combination of decisions (one 
being useless without the other) need to be taken. 
 
7.2. Procedural decision-making 
The next step would be the procedural decision by the competent authority, specifying 
which mechanism for decision-making will be applied. This decision may follow from 
existing legislation but may also be a discretionary choice of the authority in case, and it 
is to determine (conclusively) in a general or abstract sense which type of decision needs 
to be taken and, subsequently, which mechanism is prescribed or chosen. Hence, this 
decision (also) specifies which type of policy-mechanism is applied: hierarchy, network or 
market – in our case we focus on the network.  
The minimum content of the procedural decision will involve three elements – sketched in 
the below (7.2a-c).  
 
7.2a - Procedural decision; first element – general objective 
The general objective in terms of substantially solving (or addressing) the problem, 
translated in a substantive description of the desired outcome of the decision-making 
process. As it is characteristic of a wicked policy problem that this substantive description 
is incomplete, because rational input and legitimacy are suboptimal, the substantive 
description will be general, abstract, tentative and/or provisional. 
The stance taken in this paper is that the procedural decision may obviate this 
descriptive fallacy by a procedural description which calls upon a network of (ad hoc) 
selected decision makers to take arrive at a decision on the basis of a prescribed 
decision-making process. In other words: substantive incompleteness is overcome by 
procedural completeness. Needless to say, however, that although this procedural 
approach obviates substantive fallacy, in itself it will remain an imperfect solution as it 
                                                
10 PM Abundant literature on public agenda setting... 
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will not foresee all possible situations and hence leave open procedural indeterminacies 
and ex post undesirable outcomes. Therefore the competent authority will probably want 
to retain the competence to refute any outcome of the network that in its view, on the 
basis of a marginal test, can not be understood as resting upon reasonable deliberation 
(in which case – time permitting – the network would have to reconsider) – see step nr. 
4. 
 
7.2b - Procedural decision; second element – selection of participants 
The selection of participants basically follows the type of decision-making procedure, in 
our case through PPP-networking. The premise underlying this selection is that the 
network takes a decision that is in principle externally binding, in the sense that, setting 
apart the abovementioned ‘marginal test’ to exclude unreasonable outcomes, the 
competent authority is committed to implementing the outcome, with binding 
consequences (legal and otherwise) for the ‘outside world’. Hence the selection of 
participants is important both in terms of who’s included (and why) and who’s excluded 
(and why) – although procedural arrangements may soften this divide when excluded 
parties are given the opportunity of presenting their views or launching a complaint.  
In terms of inclusion the main abstract criteria are rationality and legitimacy. Hence 
selection will have to take place in terms of suitability to remediate the lack of rationality 
(in terms of input of information, knowledge or expertise), and the lack of legitimacy (in 
terms of positive input by interested parties).11 
 
Here, in the ‘simple option’, the stance is taken that selection on the basis of these 
criteria should be regarded in terms of ‘adding competence to procedure’. Criteria for 
selection should rest on the desire to include necessary competences (bridging the 
fallacy), while at the same time avoiding an adverse or perverse use of competences (for 
private interests only). This means that the competent authority must:  
1. make explicit which resources or means for decision-making present the authority 
with a lack of or, respectively, a need for an input concerning rationality and 
legitimacy. Note, that these resources or means relate to the envisaged network 
decision only, not to the stage of implementing this decision (once authorized by the 
competent authority), as this implementation may also involve PPP. Note also, that 
prior knowledge of the fact that implementation may also be in need of private party 
participation, may lead to the abovementioned adverse or perverse use.12 
2. define the required input in abstract indicators for selection and make explicit which 
type of participant (as a class) may fit the indicator and which mechanism for 
selection is fitting to reach optimal input with least fear for adverse or perverse 
effects.  
Consider firstly, that a specification of competence is needed as a basis for 
selection, such as: which information, knowledge or expertise is deemed necessary, 
which interests are involved and how should these be given a voice (such as for 
instance the environmental or nature conservation interest, the interest of public 
transport, the interest of private transport, of regional business etc.), i.e. who is best 
to articulate and/or negotiate these interests. Theoretically, it will be especially 
difficult to separate different types of rationality and legitimacy and also the 
necessary measure of both needed for proper decision-making in the network: which 
types of additional information or knowledge are needed (or ‘on what’; is 
entrepreneurship also a relevant resource)?; which interests are in need of a voice 
(only the above, or also others)?; where to draw the line in terms of remote interests 
(even a local ring road may influence the national economy or a transboundary 
                                                
11 Interest of interested parties in a positive output may also be a measure of legitimacy, but touches on the 
substantive results of the decision-making process and hence seems more relevant in terms of procedure than 
adding to selection.  
12 For instance by aiming for a decision which in implementation requires the use of specific assets that places 
one of the private participants in the decision-making in an advantageous position in a possible future tender. 
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habitat) or in terms of knowledge needed (dependent on the type of decision that 
needs to be taken).13 
Consider secondly that for each type of competence it will be necessary to determine 
the (aggregated) level of representation (individual persons, organizations, networks) 
that may offer information or voice its knowledge, expertise or interest. Identifying 
the ‘embodiment’ of representation (or personification) is important especially with 
regard to the actual selection. Ideally, the embodiment presents the perfect proxy to 
the specific competence; primarily to get the competence aboard, but also to keep 
incongruent interests (interests perverting the competence needed or disturbing the 
otherwise arranged and balanced selection of interest representation) out. This 
means then that the level of representation, i.e. the type of embodiment is chosen as 
such that it ensures, positively, the best available support needed, and, negatively, 
minimizes adverse or perverse interests or motives. Clearly embodiment may also 
stretch out to which combinations of competences are or aren’t acceptable, as a 
reductionist approach (one competence one personification) need not be the only 
option; some environmental organisations may offer a desirable combination of 
interest and knowledge, as others, for instance a university research group, may 
represent only particular knowledge. 
3. Make the selection. The afore second consideration (on identifying embodiment and 
choosing proxy) provides the basis for selection as it identifies the type of person or 
organization in terms of specific, yet abstract, characteristics. The step may already 
include identification of persons and organizations which present themselves as 
possible candidates – either in terms of existing contacts (in the network of the 
competent authority) or as the outcome of an ‘open call’ for participants. This step 
will include the determination of whether a candidates fits the description, but also 
(certainly as a new element), if more candidates seem eligible to a specific position 
(representing a certain competence, or set of competences), a mechanism for 
choosing between candidates will be necessary. 
Deciding on who fits the ticket will primarily be a matter of checking the indicators or 
descriptors, which may already exclude some candidates – as they are presumed 
unable to deliver the desired competence or only at a ‘price’ that the competent 
authority does not want to pay – both in monetary terms and in terms of perverse 
interests.  
To select amongst candidates may, firstly, be a matter of comparing qualities (‘Who 
has more knowledge on what?’ or ‘Who represents what best?’).14 Consider, for 
instance, two Environmental NGO’s willing to voice the environmental interest with 
regard to a project on a new connecting highway between two major cities. They may 
differ in terms of their organization (e.g. a society versus a trust; terms of funding; 
openness to outsiders), in terms of their goals (national versus local; environment 
versus nature; etc.), in terms of activities (e.g. only legal procedures, scientific 
research, awareness campaigns) and in terms of experience (long standing versus 
newcomer), to name but some. What offers the best fit?  
 
An important element in selecting is to rule out biases (undesirable/perverting 
interests) and avoid improper ‘favouritism’.15 This latter point is especially, but not 
exclusively, important in relation to commercial private parties as candidates to 
participate (for instance on the basis of their expertise in the particular type of project 
that need to be decided upon). If such a candidate is a competitor on the market, his 
involvement in the decision-making network should not disturb market positions, i.e. 
should be based on the (most) fitting and most cost-effective bid (which in this 
example boils down to a tender on consultancy expertise). Hence in this simple option 
                                                
13 This is also a matter for ‘bounded rationality’ that in all projects somewhere a line must be drawn deciding 
which (scientific) uncertainties we are willing to allow for. 
14 Which may lead to a multi-dimensional comparison. 
15 This section is presented in Italic to underline that it reflects on several underlying difficulties and dilemma’s 
concerning selection (i.e. inclusion and exclusion). 
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means selecting private commercial parties a market-mechanism (e.g. the tender) 
may be necessary to finally select the candidate).  
In selecting non-commercial participants a ‘substantive judgment’ is probably the 
most appropriate mechanism for selection, but possibly a game-theoretical test to 
find the ideal mix between strongly voicing the interest but at the same time being 
willing to negotiate seriously, is available.16 It should be clear that for an NGO to 
participate this would not be by virtue of the private interests of its staff, members or 
supporters, but its suitability to present and promote a particular public 
value/interest. In as far as this interest is best expressed by the consumers of a 
certain service (such as travellers in public transport), an organization that best 
represents these consumers may be selected by virtue of its communicative capability 
to do so.   
Clearly, it will be up to the competent authority to set the relevant criteria and make 
the relevant selection. The choice of criteria may to some extent correlate with the 
choice of procedural rules (which we will address below) – such as on the issue of 
negotiating skills of ‘representatives’. In this simple option we will no 
overcomplicate. Then again, having used the term ‘representatives’, we are 
inescapably confronted with the comparison between the parliamentary-model and 
the network-model of decision-making. There is no definition on intrinsic or 
substantive criteria for selecting parliamentarians, at least none other than (the 
extrinsic element of) convincing (a party ballot committee and then) a sufficient 
number of voters. Furthermore, a parliamentarian will be involved in a broad 
spectrum of decisions, rather than a single or at least limited number of specific ones. 
In addition, in most countries a parliamentarian is, once elected, not institutionally 
bound by his voters or party (i.e. holds the institutional right to a free vote or 
conscience vote).17 This is believed to enhance the focus on the general interest 
which should be at heart of parliamentary decision-making and control, rather than 
merely bundling and confronting private social interests.  
An important choice in PPP will be whether ‘representatives’, as they are selected on 
the basis of their competence in enhancing rationality or legitimacy, should act on a 
‘personal’ basis, being individually competent and ‘free to vote’, individually 
competent and in voting limited thereto, or ‘impersonal’ as a tied-in representative 
speaking on behalf of the selected embodiment/proxy (as an organisation), or even 
interchangeable as the organisation behind the person may choose to change 
representatives as it sees fit (which leaves hardly any room for a free to vote option). 
When we look at this spectrum of (only some of the) theoretical possibilities of 
representation, it needs to be clarified (at least) that even in the simple option or 
model, the ambition is to reach beyond the scope of mere ‘service or competence 
procurement’. In broadening the knowledge and legitimacy base of decision-making 
in a PPP-network perspective, government is reaching beyond mere advice by offering 
a share in decision-making power. This share is taken to be necessary as it provides 
an incentive to the parties concerned to actively (and responsibly) involving 
themselves in decision making, knowing that involvement may serve their personal, 
private interests. These private interests may be served in several ways, such as: 
- firstly, but least provoking, by a payment for services rendered; taking part in 
decision-making and providing knowledge, information and communicative aid, 
takes time and resources and should come with a reward 
(payment/compensation); 
- secondly, more provokingly, the possibility of influencing decision making may 
serve private interests of the parties involved (better than in not participating) as 
‘none or not for profit organisations’ may find that the public interest they 
represent is voiced more efficiently and effectively than would otherwise be the 
case, and whereas ‘for profit’ organisations may find that other parties involved, 
                                                
16 A ‘willingness to pay’ type of test, determining what sacrifices the NGO is willing to make to participate (is the 
interest involved sufficiently important to the NGO?) may also be a useful tool. PM 
17 Other than an incidental right, on a specific issue. The Dutch phrase for this institutional right reads: ‘Zonder 
last of ruggespraak’ (Without instruction and under no obligation to consult).  
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amongst which government representatives, get a better understanding of the 
added value the organisation can bring (awareness/exposure),     
- thirdly, the creation of mutual commitment reaching best outcomes networks for 
involves a sharing of resources, which extends to sharing in the surplus that the 
cooperation delivers. Parties to the cooperation should have something in the way 
of a common or shared intellectual property. Cooperation should work as an open 
source activity, which means that information and knowledge that is put in may 
be used by all. Certainly specific restrictions may be in place and furthermore, 
some information and knowledge may become public as the decision taken does 
require ample and accessible argumentative underpinning (sharing in the 
common residual claim).18 
 
These incentives are important as government will want to ensure willingness to take 
part and, more specifically, willingness to provide resources (information, knowledge, 
support), willingness to actively interact and make necessary trade-offs 
(preparations, negotiations) and commitment to revolve the problem by delivering 
one or more option to a possible decision. The essential element here is that the 
nature of the problem involved requires an intense interaction between expertise and 
interests and a motivation of the parties involved to seek innovative solutions and 
effectively decide upon such solutions. Hence the ambition overrides the procurement 
image and reaches onto actual delegation of decision-making power.19 The parties are 
not merely actors in a play, selected to give their best in performing their part within 
a given script and at the hand of the director, but they are, within a broad 
framework, the preselected joint directors/play-writers (and actors come in once we 
reach the implementation stage). Hence their cooperation as a network is not a mere 
package of specific services, in terms of information, knowledge, expertise, 
articulated interest, but a group effort. 
So, the parties selected are those that may be considered the best proxy of their 
class of existing embodiments of the expertise or legitimate interest involved, taking 
specific competences as primary indicators, but including willingness and commitment 
to cooperate (which may also be phrased as a particular competence). Consider, on 
this point, that legitimacy was described as reaching agreement on political choice, 
which overarches the mere voicing of a particular interest at stake. Likewise, 
rationality is not merely input of information and knowledge, but involves debate and 
internalisation.  
Finally, given the fact that the decision to be taken rest upon a legal power to 
introduce unilaterally binding acts, the final outcome will have to abide by legal rules 
& principles (which in part is what the governmental participants in the PPP-network 
represent). Some of these may already be included in the description of the objective 
of cooperation, but as the solution to the ‘wicked problem’ may vary in its scope, 
dimensions and effects, legal consideration will be relevant throughout the process 
and certainly the outcome will, if and when authorised by the relevant competent 
authority, have to meet the legal requirements. To ex ante ensure legally desired 
commitment and enhance the chances at reaching an ex post legally sound outcome, 
it will in all likelihood be necessary to: 
- firstly, include only those parties that have committed themselves to a code of 
good governance in terms of their own organisation and activities, and, 
- secondly, to ensure commitment of these parties to a set of leading principles of 
good network governance whilst in the process of cooperation and thereafter 
(in as much as relevant). 
It is in this perspective that we may find an important example of how value hybridity 
may be conceptualised. Consider in this regard the Principles of proper public 
governance (Beginselen van deugdelijk overheidsbestuur) as proposed by the Dutch 
minister of the Interior. These include: 1. openness and integrity (offering information 
                                                
18 In essence this third element presents a property rights angle to PPP-network cooperation. 
19 Of course less far-reaching option may in practise be on the table, but this paper’s quest is to explore the 
ultimate viable option.  
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and clarity and acting responsibly); 2. proper provision of services; 3. participation 
(concerning those within and outside the organisation); 4. purposiveness and 
effectiveness (setting objectives, acting accordingly); 5. legitimate and lawful; 6. self-
cleaning and learning (willingness to improve performance); 7. accountable 
(regularly, frequently and generous; to outside stakeholders).(BZK 2008) These are 
mere examples of principles that could be used as a point of departure in shaping the 
organisational principles that should be drivers in private parties if they are to be 
eligible to participate and to the proceedings in the PPP-network arena.  
Clearly, as to some private parties it will be important to find whether this principles 
of good public governance coincide with for instance typical corporate governance 
values such as those set, in the Netherlands, in the code Tabaksblat.(Tabaksblat 
2003) 
An important issue for debate on the network governance code is whether more 
private interest influence is allowed than in terms of specifics that are indifferent to 
the public values that lie at the heart of the decision that is to be taken. Similarly to 
that it isn’t up to government to determine who is to ask for environmental permits 
(under ‘hierarchy’) and up to government to decide if a private enterprise presents a 
bid in a tender over providing public services and whether this enterprise offers 
certain extra’s above the level of the minimum level of public service (as agreed in 
the tender – so under ‘market’), maybe there should be room for particular private 
interests influencing the outcomes, as long as these are indifferent to selection and to 
the public interest involved in the decision-making). 
 
In addition in the design of PPP-Network arrangements, it may prove to be necessary 
to introduce legislation that remedies legal loopholes concerning what in essence is 
a delegation of administrative power; more importantly, administrative power 
involving discretion in weighing public interests. The underlying question is whether 
legally it can be made acceptable that unilateral decisions, in which only public values 
should rule,20 private interests are sufficiently excluded from influencing decision-
making. Note that in legal doctrine a delegation of government power is only possible 
on a legislative basis and often requires a specific legislative act.  
In legislation the problem of private interest is obviated as all private persons have a 
say in the formation of parliament, and representatives are, once elected, formally 
separated from their voters. In administrative acts, public offices are under legal 
obligation only to decide on grounds of designated public interests while abiding by 
public values such as legal principles. In network decision-making only few private 
parties are included in decision-making and even though these parties are selected as 
they are regarded the most competent, this does not in itself exclude that their 
private interest can wilfully or unwillingly permeate the weighing of interests. 
Of course apart from selection, this matter may be addressed in terms of controls, 
such as in the aforementioned authorisation of the network proposals by the 
competent authority. Controls, by this authority or by third and independent parties 
(as in, finally, the administrative courts), should however not be regarded as the 
remedy to inadequate ex ante provisions. As to the role of the competent authority 
the danger would be that a refusal to authorise on grounds of private interest bias 
would be criticised as a refusal of hierarchical public powers to share influence with 
private parties. Courts may come under the suspicion of over-influencing the 
weighing of interests and thus not respecting the separation of powers (vis a vis the 
executive branch of government).21 Clearly however, controls may offer 
compensation to those private parties which are excluded from the network. Hence 
this aspect is an issue for further investigation, not addressed in this paper. Some of 
the essential elements will be: 
o how to keep private interests of decision makers at bay? A question that rests on 
the separation of dominium and imperium; the principle of non-identification 
                                                
20 As drivers, with legal indifference to private interests. 
21 Compare the criticism on the Council of State decision on the PPP A4 decision. PM 
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and the equality-principle. The determination of public values (in the particular 
context) should not be influenced by the private interests of participants, but only 
by their competence and willingness to cooperate (see 2c); 
o the principle that government decisions should respect market relations and not 
favour one enterprise against another, unless on the basis of market parameter of 
efficient service (the fair competition principle); 
o the position of (excluded) third parties (with an interest), both citizens and 
consumers. Legitimacy will surely not be served if inclusion is decided on bias 
(also because this may shed doubts on the rationality of decision-making). 
Consumers may fear that the influence of their market transactions on price and 
quality of goods and services on offer is ill-influenced by government intervention. 
 
Finally, it must be remembered that to select parties to cooperate presupposes their 
interest to commit. Clearly this commitment must be clear not only upon unilateral 
selection (ex ante) by the competent authority, but also once selection is completed and 
cooperation begins. In terms of legal bindingness of commitment the procedural decision 
of the competent authority should be based on, include or reflect this reciprocal 
commitment between parties (for instance on the basis of prior contracts between each 
or indeed all private parties and the competent authority).   
 
7.2c - Procedural decision; third element – form & procedure 
Determining the co-operative form and procedure will in practice coincide (or may even 
precede the above). The essential choice will be that of what type of cooperation is 
considered most desirable.  
Legally speaking the main choice is that between cooperation in an organized legal entity 
(a legal person), which then allows for different types and subsequent different patterns 
of internal decision-making and external representation, or cooperation on the basis of a 
relational contract between separate parties binding them with regard to their share and 
commitment to decision-making and the reciprocal share and commitment of others (in 
terms of rights and duties to effort and results). 
The competent authority will have to decide on the basis of criteria for choosing the type 
of cooperation it aspires. The basis of cooperation as addressed in this paper is expressed 
in the above:  
1. the constitutive reciprocal willingness of all participants to commit to cooperation by 
delivering its competences/resources;  
2. the explicit acceptance of the openness or incompleteness of the substantive 
objective as a challenge of cooperation;  
3. the acceptance also of rules concerning coordination and decision-making within the 
cooperative setting;  
4. acceptance of the outcomes of the partnership (following 1-3) as binding for all and 
possibly for outside third/parties [check wording]. 
 
Still this leaves open what the internal rules of the game are to be and whether 
cooperation will take the shape of a separate entity or of a contractual relationship 
between separate parties.  
Much will depend on the motives for and intent of cooperation. Does the basis lie with 
mutual dependencies (one party can not act without the other)? It would seem so as the 
premise behind the wicked policy problem suggests a need, at least on the part of the 
competent authority, to add ‘reason and legitimacy’ to the decision-making.  
Other parties may, however, have a different stance regarding the process, perhaps 
more adequately described as an ‘opportunity’ rather than a ‘necessity’. Clearly though, 
the underpinning notion is that to reach the objective cooperation, in terms of working 
together by bringing together resources (competences), is a necessary requirement, 
resting on the intention to reach the result by applying procedural rules for decision-
making by which the combination and use of resources is decided upon. Cooperation may 
differ to the extent in which each participant has an equal say in the matter or even has 
a right of veto (or merely the certainty that a qualified majority will be necessary). 
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Furthermore, cooperation will mean that the parties involved will not counteract each 
other.  
 
As the competent authority decides upon form and procedure and parties selected 
declare their willingness to abide by these constraints, clearly the common objective is 
paramount to the proceedings. Nevertheless, the concept of a hybridity of values, as 
coined in the above, suggests that participants are expected to ‘act naturally’, delivering 
their competences and resources on the basis of their private (commercial or not for 
profit) interest to do so. This suggests a heterogeneous background to the decision-
making process rather than a homogeneous concept as suggested when a governmental 
body (other than a parliament) decides. 
Furthermore, on the basis of this heterogeneous concept, participants act together, 
regardless of their title, that is regardless of whether their basis for participation lies with 
the aspect of legitimacy or of expertise. This presupposes that for wicked policy problems 
we depart from a rather primitive ‘bucket theory’ of decision making: as long as all 
competences (as decision-making resources) are in the bucket, somehow the best 
‘solution’ will result (the assignment by the competent authority being the stirring-spoon, 
burner or prime mover. Of course this is a matter that needs further elaboration, but 
again it emphasizes the need to regard both rationality and legitimacy as concepts that 
rise above the input of specific competences, carried by single participants to the 
process. 
 
7.3. PPP network cooperation 
The third step in the decision-making process will be the process of actual PPP 
network-cooperation. This is probably initiated by a constitutive agreement and/or 
constitutive meeting in accordance with the ‘rules of the game’, as set under 2c, 
involving participants, as selected under 2b. This is in fact how the ‘substances in the 
bucket will react’ and hopefully result in an outcome that entirely or most closely meets 
with the substantive criteria set under 2a. In all likelihood many PPP-decisions will go 
through a draft-stage in which the competent authority or a party assigned by the 
competent authority can give its views on the draft decision (setting apart the possibility 
of consultations ad interim).    
 
7.4. Bestowing authority 
As the procedural decision (2.) rests on the presumed politico-administrative primacy of 
the government body or office concerned over the decision that must be taken (and 
subsequently implemented), it follows legally that this competent authority must 
authorize the outcome of the PPP-network cooperation. Only then can the procedure lead 
to a decision with legal status.  
The crucial element will be that the competent authority must, pursuant to the PPP (first 
stage) decision: 
1. perform a test of formal and/or procedural conformity to the procedural decision as 
described in Step 2. This should not be a substantial basis. At its most this test would 
take the shape of the famous marginal reasonability test on arbitrariness as 
performed by courts in administrative cases. If the outcome of the PPP cooperation is 
so out of tune with the procedural decision in Step 2, that it cannot, within reason, be 
regarded as an outcome of that procedure, the competent authority must conclude 
that the decision presented as such is invalid and must be sent back for re-
evaluation. The basis for this test lies with two considerations: 
o incompleteness even of the procedural ‘contract’ that forms the basis of PPP; 
o the fact that the participants to the PPP are mere proxies of the competences that 
were deemed necessary to a rational and legitimate outcome and as such 
interests incongruent with the general interest may have perverted the outcome.   
2. formalise in terms of implementation provide a legal dictum by which the competent 
authority expresses its formal acceptance (expressing that the outcome of PPS is 
authoritative in terms of conformity within reason with the objectives and boundary 
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rules of the procedural decision in step 2) and its formal consequences (such as 
changes in legal positions and instructions for implementation) 
 
7.5. Implementation  
Implementation of the decision taken under step nr. 4, possibly involving PPP. As this is 
not the focus of this paper, this step is not elaborated upon. Two brief notes should 
suffice: 
- a party with an interest in participating in an implementory PPP may ‘suffer from’ a 
bias in promoting certain decisions as they pave the way for the selection criteria in 
this 5th step. Safeguards are required to ensure impartiality;  
- in practise implementation and primary decision making may iterate.  
 
7.6. Final results 
Hopefully implementation will address, solve or aid in solving the policy problem 
identified under nr. 1. 
 
 
8. The organisation of value hybridity- part 3 (concluding remarks) 
 
From the viewpoint of expressing, serving and protecting public values, the above simple 
model of PPP immediately confronts us with some major problems. As was stated in the 
above, trust should be the major driving force behind PPP. The simple model provides a 
framework that seeks to balance this aspect against the requirements of a policy 
programme geared at taking binding decisions concerning specific public values. There 
needs to be certainty about reaching the objective (the ‘solution’ to the problem at hand) 
but also about reaching this result within normative public governance requirement, 
among which the exclusion of private interests determining outcomes, disturbance of 
market relations, and respect for (principles of) legal certainty, equality and proper care. 
 
The only way of staying clear from these requirements is to place the decision making 
process outside the public sector realm and into the realm of private initiative (and 
market forces). The premise of this paper is that this would call for more trust in the 
market mechanism (i.e. absence of market failure) than is provided for in the cases of 
wicked policy problems as targeted here (and the financial crisis of 2008 wakes one 
wonder if a broader range of problems deserves a more sceptical appraisal on market 
forces).  
Choosing to use the PPP-network approach, considering proposed advantages in terms of 
rationality and legitimacy, inevitably places coordination in terms of mainly procedural 
complete conditions (proper mechanisms for selecting competence and adequate 
safeguards against ‘private interest perversion’), against the backdrop of trust-based in 
sharing in surplus. To accept such an arrangement in terms of public governance law 
requirements can only be envisaged if the wickedness of the underlying problem is 
accepted for what it is. Similar to the initial soft law approach to recent technological 
breakthroughs (such as on nano- or biotechnology), there needs to be an understanding 
that as our solutions for these type of problems are (as yet) incomplete, our safeguards 
are incomplete too. The model of placing PPP within the framework of government 
hierarchical decision making, comprising, amongst others, the ‘authorisation’ as 
explained in step nr. 4 (including a marginal test on reasonableness) may on the one 
hand pave the element of trust within the PPP-network under threat, and it may on the 
other hand at least ensure the much desired minimum level of legal certainty on 
acceptable end results. 
 
A major conclusion of this paper as to the public values debate is, that such a debate has 
marginal relevance if it isn’t placed within an institutional and organisational context. In 
as much as a definition of public values will correlate or contrast with the notion of 
private values, it stands to reason to especially look at public private interfaces that rest 
on the aspiration or assumption that a true value exchange or is possible. Our 
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preliminary analyses points in the direction that an exchange is possible in the sense of ‘a 
possible match’, not as a (free style) ‘osmosis’ but only if and when we ensure that there 
is clarity on how interests correspond with specific values, so the decision making 
process isn’t corrupted.22 To what extend network governance structures may allow for 
an impetus by private interests, remains a matter for further research. Much of what has 
been suggested in terms of threats and opportunities will still have to be specified, tested 
and compared in terms of legal designs for PPP-arrangements for different types of 
wicked policy challenges. To the researchers of this paper, that will be the next step. 
 
Enschede, October 2008  
 
 
                                                
22 Clearly this statement should be understood in the context of our premise that by law government may only 
serve the public interest. 
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